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EVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN CHINESE CULTURE 
Martin K. Whyte 
Does China need a uniform set of values and cultural practices in order to remain unified as  
a nation, develop, and prosper? If so, what combination of traditional Chinese customs and 
values, Marxist-Leninist (or Maoist) practices, and Western influences should be used to form 
Chinese culture in the reform era? Is it even possible, in fact, to forge a new cultural consensus 
out of such disparate elements? Should any such cultural consensus be allowed to emerge 
naturally out of the competition among different ideas and cultural systems, or should the central 
authorities strictly control what cultural elements are allowed and attempt to define and impose 
their vision of a cultural orthodoxy on the population? Many countries in Asia and elsewhere have 
.grappled with the problem of how to combine native and foreign cultural elements into a cohesive 
whole. But in China both the fact that not two but three distinct cultural alternatives are under 
contention (traditional Chinese, Marxist-Leninist/socialist, and Western/modern), and that there 
have been such erratic swings in governmental preference and suppression among these 
alternatives in the past, makes the problem of defining and developing such a cultural consensus 
in reform-era China particularly difficult. 
The general problem is hardly new, however. Throughout Chinese history the issue of how 
to maintain cultural cohesion has occupied the attentions of rulers and thinkers alike,' for 
Chineseness was defined more in cultural terms than in relation to things like territory or . 
citizenship. The challenges involved in confronting external influences such as  Buddhism, Islam, 
and Christianity; in occupying lands inhabited by non-Chinese populations; and in being ruled by 
non-Chinese ruling houses (e.g., the Mongols in the 13th and 14th centuries and the Manchus 
from the 17th to the 20th) continuously put the cultural cohesion of China to a test. 
For the past two millenia most thinking Chinese would have answered the first question 
posed above, a t  least, with a strong a f f i a t i v e :  China did require an enforced cultural unity to 
survive. At the root of such a judgment lies a very different set of assumptions than those that 
have held sway recently in the West, and within Western societies perhaps the United States is 
the closest to being a t  the "opposite pole" from China. 
The Quest for  Cultural Cohesion prior to 1949 
In the dominant philosophy of China over these last two milennia, influenced by 
Confucianism and its later variants and interpretations, society was conceived of ideally as a giant 
hierarchy of human relationships and interdependencies. Culture and values were concerned 
centrally with how individuals should behave in regard to their parents, their children, their older 
and younger siblings, their teachers, their employers or employees, their local officials, and all the 
other relationships in which they were enmeshed within this hierarchy. Only if each individual 
followed the proper ways would there be social harmony, and if the entire population could be 
taught and made to obey in the proper ways, there would be societal unity, strength, and 
prosperity. The role of political leaders, even up to and including the emperor, in this frankly 
utopian vision was more as  moral guardians and preachers than simply as administrators. If 
political authorities did not maintain cultural uniformity, by propounding orthodoxy and screening 
out alien values and practices, and if they did not live up to their obligations to set a positive 
moral example, to teach the correct ways, and to enforce compliance on their subjects, then the 
result could only be chaos. 
In this sort of vision there was obviously not much place for autonomous subcultures, free 
competition between groups and ideas, individual privacy and freedom of conscience, and other 
ideas cherished in the modern West. The American assumption, nourished by a multi-ethnic 
heritage, that competition between groups, ideas, and values leads, in an almost Adam Smithian 
manner, to national strength and even eventually, perhaps, to some sort of naturally evolved 
cultural consensus, is quite alien to most Chinese. Indeed, many Chinese wonder how it can be 
that American society has not yet been torn apart by its cultural diversity and freedom. 
Throughout the imperial era, then, most Chinese accepted on faith the idea that, even 
though the specific content of Chinese culture and values might be modified and added to over 
time, still it was necessary a t  any point in time for the central authorities to define the orthodoxy 
of the moment and forcibly impose it throughout the realm. But in the final years of imperial 
China the quest for cultural cohesion was sorely tested, both by internal disintegration and by the 
growing impact on China of the Western powers. In the late 19th century a struggle emerged 
between conservatives and modernizers around the court, with the conservatives determined to 
defend traditional Chinese ways and fend off Western influences. But even the modernizers did 
not propose accepting Western assumptions about culture, as  briefly sketched above. Rather, they 
argued that China faced yet another instance in which elements of a new, alien set of cultural 
influences had to be selectively added, while still maintaining strict official control over the 
process. For that purpose they popularized the slogan, "Chinese learning as the foundation, 
Western learning for its practical applications" (zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong). 
One can debate.whether various Western techniques of science, armaments, medicine, law, 
and so forth really could have been extracted from their Western context and used in China 
without giving rise to conflicts with traditional Chinese culture and values, as  this slogan implied, 
but the issue was never put to a true test. What happened instead was that the weakness of the 
Qing state and the forceful imposition of Western influence by foreign traders, diplomats, 
missionaries, and others prevented the imperial authorities from maintaining the control over 
cultural life that they sought. The results only confirmed the beliefs of most Chinese that an 
imposed cultural orthodoxy is vital to national unity. Much of the century prior to 1949, and 
particularly following the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, was characterized by cultural diversity 
and competition accompanied by disunity and social chaos. 
In the period between 1911 and 1949 a variety of efforts were made to define a new 
cultural orthodoxy and to use this to restore national political unity. China's students and 
intellectuals, in particular, flirted with a wide variety of beliefs and philosophies, and in those 
years one could find advocates of liberalism, pragmatism, socialism, Christianity, pacifism, sexual 
liberation, Esperanto, rural literacy campaigns, "scientism," general Westernization--indeed, 
almost any new faith or set of ideas found eager adherents in China. Figures like John Dewey, 
Bertrand Russell, and George Bernard Shaw paid visits to China and met eager crowds of 
disciples. 
In the years known as the "May Fourth Period" (following 1919), many searchers for a new 
faith mounted caustic attacks on traditional Chinese culture and values, which were described as 
the root causes of fatalism, conservatism, individual unhappiness, and the inability of China to 
stand up to her foreign tormentors. But in spite of the considerable cultural diversity and 
competition of those years, for most of those involved the issue was not a search for personal and 
group solace and fulfillment in the midst of chaos. Instead, this was a contest to determine what 
the content of a new and modern Chinese culture might be, with the final goal still one of finding 
the set of ideas and values which could be used to unite the Chinese people and make the nation -
strong again. 
When Chiang Kai-shek established shaky political unity after 1927, he and other leaders of 
his Nationalist regime attempted to define a new cultural orthodoxy that was an amalgam of 
Western and traditional Chinese ideas, but with "backward" and "superstitious" elements of the 
tradition excluded. However, the Nationalist regime's efforts to formulate this new cultural 
orthodoxy, as  in the "New Life Movement" in the mid-1930s, were extremely vague, and in any 
case the Nanking government never had sufficient power to effectively impose any set of values 
throughout the land. 
During the century prior to 1949, China's neighbor to the east, Japan, was forging an 
accommodation between traditional and Western cultural elements, so that each new foreign 
practice was not seen as  a threat to fundamental "Japaneseness." But in China during the same 
period the debate over how to accomplish this transition remained unresolved. Indeed, as we shall 
see, it remains unresolved even today. 
Mao's Revolution and Chinese Culture 
At first glance, it might appear that the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
1949 marked a fundamental victory of alien Western culture over traditional Chinese culture. 
After all, the CCP itself was a product of the May Fourth Era, when Mao Zedong and other 
founders of the CCP vigorously denounced the evils of traditional Confucian ways, eagerly read 
recently translated Marxist texts, and tried to follow events in the newly established Soviet Union. 
When the CCP came to power in 1949, Marxism-Leninism (or Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
thought) was proclaimed as  the new orthodoxy, with Confucianism and a whole range of 
traditional customs and values denounced and suppressed. 
The hostility of the CCP to traditional Chinese culture only reached its zenith, though, 
during the last ten years of Mao's life. During the Cultural Fkvolution (1966-69) red guards, 
inspired by Mao, ransacked private homes and vandalized temples and monuments in an effort to 
eliminate the "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs, and habits). Large quantities of traditional 
scrolls, porcelain, musical instruments, and other priceless objects were destroyed or confiscated 
by the red guards, or in some cases were tearfully destroyed by their owners in the hopes of 
warding off red guard wrath. Ancestral tablets and shrines were ransacked and destroyed as 
well, and monasteries were closed and monks and nuns were forced to devote themselves to 
"socially useful labor" in fields, mines, and factories. Traditional opera performances were banned 
and were replaced by a limited number of new "revolutionary operas" developed under the 
personal supervision of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. And a few years after the reigning in of the red 
guards, a campaign was launched (in 1973) against Confucianism in a n  effort to eliminate the 
lingering influence of the ideas of China's greatest philosopher. 
Yet it would be oversimplifying things to see the period of Mao's rule as an overall assault 
on traditional Chinese culture, and the reform era since as  involving primarily a revival of this 
long-suppressed traditional culture. The reality is much more complex. Even though the CCP 
espoused a Western ideology, Marxism-Leninism, 1949 in no way constituted a victory for 
wholesale Westernization and a repudiation of traditional Chinese values. In certain very basic 
respects, in fact, Maoist rule emphasized very fundamental Chinese traditions and defended these 
against rival Western ideas. Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to argue that Maoism in power 
represented a last ditch, and now abandoned (at least for the moment), Chinese defense against 
Western cultural influence. 
To be sure, the CCP was not simply a traditional dynasty disguised in Marxist-Leninist 
slogans. A variety of far-reaching institutional changes were made in Chinese society, many 
traditional customs and cultural practices (such a s  arranged marriages, burials, spirit mediums, 
kowtowing to elders, and so forth) were discouraged or bznned, and new ideas, concepts, and 
cultural forms were forcefully introduced, in some cases in the face of popular resistance or 
incomprehension. Spoken dramas with factory workers as  heroes, an emphasis on struggle and 
social class unity rather than on harmony and kinship solidarity, suppression of mercantile 
instincts, pronouncements that man was descended from apes, encouragement to call non-kin 
"comrade" and one's spouse "belovedw--these and many other new things about CCP rule took 
some getting used to by many if not most Chinese. China became, a s  a result, a very different 
kind of social order. Lest we forget, there really was a CCP-led revolution in China. 
Yet in certain very basic respects Maoist rule was not really so iconoclastic, and in fact had 
deep roots in Chinese tradition. Ancient Chinese assumptions about social order were built upon 
and reinforced, even though they began to be interpreted in Marxist-Leninist, rather than in 
Confucian, terms. Society was conceived of as a vast bureaucratic hierarchy, a hierarchy in 
which every individual was to have a place and had to be subordinated to the social group (now 
termed a "collective") in which he or she was enmeshed. National unity was to be fostered by 
developing a coherent set of values (to which we would now give the specifically modern term, 
"ideology") that would tell the population how to behave, rather than by, say, promulgating a 
national code of laws and administrative procedures. Primary duties of political leaders a t  every 
level, as  in imperial China, were to maintain the coherence of the official ideology, to indoctrinate 
the population, and to enforce compliance. Any conception of autonomous subgroups, independent 
cultural creation, or a free-wheeling competition of ideas was directly contrary to the Maoist ethos, 
a s  it was to the traditional imperial doctrines of rule. 
So the content of the culture in Maoist China was in many ways new, but ideas that China 
required a uniform culture to survive a s  a nation, and that the authorities should be centrally 
concerned with enforcing orthodoxy in order to maintain cultural, and thus political, cohesion, were 
very old. This was not old wine in new bottles, but rather new wine in old bottles. However, the 
vigor with which Mao and those around them imposed their new orthodoxy stemmed in part from 
the fact that in this case their Marxist-Leninist convictions reinforced traditional Chinese 
assumptions. Socialism entails central planning and regulation not only of economic production, 
but of all of social life, including cultural life, values, and popular customs. The prevailing image 
in Marxism-Leninism is of society a s  a single, well regulated factory, rather than as a hierarchical 
chain of human relationships, but the implications are much the same. There is one correct way 
for society to be organized, and cultural unity and officially imposed ideology play central roles in 
maintaining societal cohesion. Allowing alternative values and cultural practices would hinder the 
pursuit of socialism and communism even as it would foster political disunity. 
In spite of the considerable overlap between traditional Chinese assumptions about cultural 
. unity and Marxist-Leninist ones, there is also a very basic difference in practice. The CCP, using 
modern technology, a huge central bureaucracy, and organizational practices learned from the 
Soviet Union, has had the wherewithal1 to put these ideas into practice much more thoroughly 
than their imperial .predecessors ever could have dreamed. The result has been much tighter 
central control over- schooling, the mass media, literature, the performing arts, associational life, 
and even styles of dress and leisure activities. Even prior to the Cultural Revolution, these 
increased powers were used with considerable effect to change traditional Chinese culture. From 
suppressing secret societies to campaigning against mah-jongg, from reforming Chinese opera 
plots to purging and standardizing school textbooks--all corners of Chinese cultural life witnessed 
the activist efforts of China's communist revolutionaries. Still the goal, it must be stressed again, 
was to forge a Chinese society that would be united around a common set of values and ideas--a 
very traditional goal. 
The power of the state was also used vigorously in the Maoist era to exclude Western 
cultural influences--initially all except those emanating from the Soviet Union, but after 1960 even 
Soviet influence as well. What was involved was not simply a matter of expelling foreigners in 
the 1950s and taking over the factories, schools, churches, hospitals, newspapers, and other 
things foreigners had owned or controlled. Efforts were also made to restrict and control foreign 
cultural influences that might come in from the outside in such forms as  movies, magazines, and 
foreign travellers. In addition, Western ideas and values that had gained some foothold in China 
in the previous century, such a s  enthusiasm for rule of law, an autonomous press, and competing 
political parties, were campaigned against, and the process of "creeping Westernization" was 
thrown into reverse. 
This was not a case of excluding all foreign influences entirely (although during the Cultural 
Revolution things came close to that). Instead, the CCP's efforts aimed to see that foreign 
influences penetrated into China only in the forms that the government chose, and on the 
government's terms. So touring Western orchestras and Western exchange students were all 
right, while listening to foreign radio broadcasts and travel abroad a t  one's own initiative were 
not. Special hotels, stores, and travel arrangements were developed in the 1950s which, while 
ostensibly aimed at shielding foreign visitors from the hardships of Chinese life, had a more 
powerful purpose in protecting most of Chinese society from possible "contamination" by foreign 
guests. The desire of China's 19th century modernizing elite to carefully screen foreign influences 
and selectively admit only those elements deemed of practical use had eluded them, but came 
much closer to being realized by their successors in post-1949 China. 
So in Mao's China the power of the state was used in an effort to forge a new cultural 
orthodoxy that would leave out large parts of both the traditional inheritance and Western culture. 
And as  already indicated, the CCP had much more ability to impose this new orthodoxy down to 
the lowest urban alleys and village lanes, and over the vast Chinese landscape, than any of their 
imperial predecessors had had. Yet for all of the vigor with which this effort was pursued, it is 
now clear that it was only partially successful. Many values and practices that were the object of 
attack in Maoist China were only driven underground, or behind closed doors, but did not 
disappear. And after Mao's death, as controls have been relaxed, both traditional and Western 
heterodox (in the Maoist view) influences have sprung back to the surface. 
Cultural Dilemmas of Reform-Era China 
The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the implementation of the reform program by his 
successors have produced a rethinking of all aspects of the Maoist social order. As part of that 
rethinking there has been a reaction against the rigid and impoverished cultural straight-jacket 
that characterized China during Mao's last decade in power. In most respects the reformers have 
allowed and encouraged a very broad cultural liberalization. Writers have been permitted to 
explore the dark side of society and to depict themes, such as  romantic love and distaste for 
politics, that Mao's stalwarts had tried to ban during the Cultural Revolution era. Artists are 
similarly allowed to revive traditional styles and to experiment with a variety of Western forms, 
including abstract and surrealistic art. Freedom of religious belief and practice have been 
reinstated, and Buddhist temples, Islamic mosques, and Christian churches have been revived and 
refurbished with official approval, to be staffed by both "rehabilitated" religious leaders and new 
graduates of reopened monasteries and seminaries. School curricula have been revamped, 
fostering not only a renewed emphasis on "pure" academics, but also the establishment of 
formerly proscribed or neglected fields, such as law, sociology, political science, and business 
management. The mass media have witnessed an explosion, with a few tightly controlled and 
highly politicized publications replaced by a bewildering variety of new and specialized journals, 
catering to those interested in calligraphy, classical Western music, the martial arts, weight- 
lifting, and a wide variety of other decidedly non-political realms. The effort to impose a uniform 
"proletarian drab" style of dress has been repudiated, and a variety of clothing styles are now 
available, ranging from traditional Chinese slit-sided dresses to miniskirts and from "Mao jackets" 
to Western suits and ties. Formerly suppressed or discouraged hobbies and leisure pursuits 
ranging from tropical fish raising to stamp collecting to playing mah-jongg have been allowed to 
revive, and specialized markets in birds, fish, spirit incense, funeral supplies, and other products 
are now widely visible. 
Official tolerance in the ideological realm has also increased. Ideas that would have been 
risky to express a few years ago, such as  that officials should be bound by laws, that interest 
groups should be recognized and allowed to compete in the political arena, or that divorce should 
be made easier, can now be raised in the reform era. And controls over the communications 
technologies by which-ideas and cultural products can be transmitted independently of the state 
have been relaxed. Computers and printers, casette recorders, mimeograph machines, Xerox 
machines, videotape recorders and other devices, a r e  not, to be sure, yet appearing in every 
Chinese peasant home, but still increasing numbers of them are in the hands of private individuals 
and local organizations who can use them in a variety of ways, not all of them pleasing to the 
authorities. 
Of course, there are clear limits to this reform era liberalization. Perhaps most important, 
the ideas and cultural products of the late Mao era are for the most part proscribed, and there is 
political risk in advocating them. So one won't see people quoting from their "little red books" of 
Mao's sayings or performing Jiang Qing's model revolutionary operas, nor publicly advocating 
mounting new class struggle campaigns. Also, periodically the authorities fulminate against 
"harmful" cultural influences that have arisen in the reform era and purge writers, arrest alleged 
disseminators of pornography, and publish new regulations against unauthorized publications. 
Still, the growing diversity and liveliness of cultural life in the post-Mao era are indisputable. 
The traditional cultural legacy has been a major beneficiary of the post-Mao liberalization. 
Everywhere one looks in China today one sees signs of a revival of a variety of traditional Chinese 
practices. A vast amount of new research and publication on ancient and imperial China have 
been undertaken, and no longer does the past all have to be portrayed as revolving around a 
simple conflict between heroic but oppressed peasants and evil and cruel landowners and officials. 
Traditional operas, music, and dance have been revived, and along with them performance troupes 
and associations dedicated to the preservation of these arts. Traditional-style painting, 
calligraphy, and other fine arts have enjoyed a renaissance as well, and one sees a new pride 
emerging in China's artistic heritage. A wide variety of tombs, monuments, and temples have 
been renovated and reopened, and again they are less likely now to be accompanied by signs 
describing how much exploitation and misery of the common people went into their construction. 
Confucius has also, one could say, been "rehabilitated." His ancestral temple and adjacent 
facilities have been refurbished, new journals and associations devoted to the study of his writings 
have been established, and international symposia have been convened on the lessons of 
Confucius's ideas for the modern world. Underlying themes in this "neo-neo-Confucianism" are 
that the great philosopher's values must play a role in explaining the economic successes of the 
other East Asian Confucian societies (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore), 
and that the PRC could benefit as  well from renewed respect for his legacy. In addition to the 
possible material benefits, it is argued that some greater stress on Confucian values like 
moderation, benevolence, harmony, and filial piety will help to overcome the social conflicts and 
frayed nerves that were legacies of the Mao era. 
Of course, not all forms of traditional Chinese culture that are reviving are ones the 
authorities look upon positively. Lavish spending on weddings and funerals, siting of graves in 
arable fields, investment by peasants in constructing new lineage halls instead of schools, a 
revival of secret societies and Daoist sects, and an  apparent resurgence of fortune tellers, spirit 
mediums, trackers in women, and female infanticide are just some of the traditional practices in 
whose reappearance the authorities take no pleasure. At least some forms of corruption that 
appear to be widespread in the reform era, involving demands for bribes and manipulation of 
personal connections, are also seen a s  reflecting harmful traditional influences. (The code word 
used here is "feudalism.") 
At the same time, and in many ways even more striking, one can see that 'the relaxation of 
official controls and the "open door policy" have fostered a major new infusion of Western cultural 
influences. The reform policies have produced major increases in foreigners operating in China as  
diplomats, businessmen, teachers, and tourists, and they have also produced an exodus of tens of 
thousands of Chinese travelling to the West, either on short business trips or for extended periods 
of foreign study. Contacts have also intensified with Chinese living abroad who have already 
made their accommodations with Western cultural practices, and particularly with Chinese from 
Hong Kong and Macao and, in a rising flood starting in 1987, with those returning for visits from 
Taiwan. In some parts of China, and particularly in coastal areas of Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces, the primary bearers of Western cultural influence are such overseas Chinese, rather 
than non-Chinese foreigners. 
Most foreign broadcasts are no longer banned or jammed, and in fact listening to them is an 
approved way to help develop valuable foreign language skills. Foreign movies are now regularly 
shown in China, as  are foreign television serials, although the selection principles are obscure. 
(Movies range from "The Sound of Music" to a violent American trucker film, "Convoy;" television 
shows range from "Little House on the Prairie" to "The Man from Atlantis," a long-since cancelled 
series detailing the efforts of a web-footed fellow to adapt to life on land in America. Football 
Super Bowls and baseball World Series now appear on Chinese television, to the evident 
puzzlement of many Chinese viewers. Japanese, European, Latin American, and recently even 
Soviet films and television shows are now shown in China as  well.) Stories about movie and 
music stars from the West and from Hong Kong and Taiwan now compete in popular magazines 
for space with stories about China's own rising performing celebrities. 
Almost forty years after the CCP railed against the seditious poison spread by Hollywood 
movies, their return to the Chinese scene produces an impact in some surprising places. Recent 
visitors to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, have been startled to see, a t  the foot of the Potala Palace 
(the former home of the exiled Dalai Lama), an establishment known as  the "Rambo Bar." 
Customers are enticed in by a mural of Sylvester Stallone in character on the front wall, wrapped 
in bandoleers of bullets and presumably destroying communist (but non-Chinese) enemies. 
Numerous other signs of foreign culture influence are everywhere a t  hand in China's cities, 
and occasionally even in rural backwaters. A very partial listing would include video parlors, pool 
halls, amusement parks (complete with "bumper cars" and "corkscrew" roller coasters), disco and 
ballroom dancing, jazz, the battle between Pepsi and Coke, cosmetic surgery, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, white wedding gowns, body building and beauty contests, commercial advertising, rock 
bands, tennis, golf, wind-surfing, and motorcross racing. And an increasing variety of translated 
foreign writings is also available to Chinese readers, ranging from classic works available earlier 
but suppressed during the Cultural Revolution, such as  those by Shakespeare, Dickens, and Victor 
Hugo, to works by currently popular fiction writers from a variety of countries, James Bond 
stories, non-fiction works by the likes. of Lee Iacocca, Dale Carnegie, Freud, Malinowski, and 
Gorbachev, and various Western popular writers on business management and futurology. 
Along with these forms of Western cultural influence, there are also officially sanctioned 
efforts to gain a new appreciation for Western institutions and values. Simplistic analyses of 
America run by a Wall Street conspiracy have been replaced by efforts to understand how the 
American electoral system works, how Congress does its business, the role of "think tanks" and 
foundations, the influence of religious organizations, and other long-neglected topics. "American 
studies" has become a booming field in Chinese academe, and the study of other foreign countries 
has also enjoyed a renaissance. Of particular interest are Western ideas about business 
management, and one now sees Chinese studying abroad in economics departments and business 
schools and Westerners coming to China to give courses on Keynesian economics, cost accounting, 
public relations, and other capitalist secrets. It is hard not to imagine Mao Zedong turning over in 
his sarcophagus a t  the thought of Western capitalists telling Chinese industrial managers how to 

rises in crime and delinquency rates. Of equal or even greater official concern is the alleged 
foreign effect on popular values, particularly among the young. The open door, i t  is argued by 
critics, has fostered doubt about the virtues of socialism, the institutions of China, and the 
leadership of the CCP, and has fostered perceptions that the institutions and values of foreign 
societies are superior. One can hear once again a theme sounded in the early 1950s--Chinese 
must be dissuaded from the notion that "the American moon shines brighter than the Chinese 
moon." 
Even though there have been persistent efforts to monitor and control foreign contacts and 
to prevent harmful- ideas and practices from coming in, the increase in foreign influence has been 
so rapid, and its forms so massive and diverse, that it has proved impossible for the authorities to 
effectively monitor ar.d control everything. To some extent this inability is inherent in the reform 
process itself, for the granting of local autonomy that is vital to the economic reforms inevitably 
leads to activities and influences that are outside of the range of central controls. 
Given the increased liveliness and diversity in the cultural realm in recent years, one must 
still ask how much the basic rules of the system have changed. Does the increased "blooming and 
contending," involving traditional Chinese and Western alongside of socialist cultural practices and 
symbols, indicate that efforts to impose cultural uniformity from above have ceased? This is far 
from being the case, although the issue is still subject to contention. There are, to be sure, some 
intellectuals and some reformers who come close to adopting a Western "marketplace of ideas" 
argument--that the open door and other current policies are good because they introduce lots of 
new ideas and cultural practices, that the competition among ideas and practices will be a healthy 
way to weed out bad or outmoded elements, and that a s  a result a modified and stronger and more 
dynamic new Chinese culture will emerge. 
Two things should be noted, though, about this sort of argument. First, it seems to be a 
minority view, with most participants in the cultural debate being uncomfortable with the sort of 
unbridled cultural competition being advocated. Second, even in this minority view, competition 
and variety in the cultural realm are seen a s  necessary but temporary. The necessity arises from 
the need to allow China to recover from the isolation and cultural impoverishment that Mao led 
her into in his final years. However, once the elements of a modified and revitalized Chinese 
culture have been identified, the competition should subside, with a new and improved cultural 
orthodoxy dominant. In other words, even in this minority and apparently proto-Western view, 
permanent cultural competition of the sort that appears to reign in the West is rejected as too 
chaotic for China. 
Many if not most participants in the debate on the future of Chinese culture are not even 
willing to go as  far a s  this minority position. Even temporary free competition of ideas and values 
is seen a s  threatening to the social order. To those who hold this view, Chinese culture needs to 
be modified and changed, but this should be done in a careful and controlled manner. Individuals, 
groups, organizations, and localities should not have that much autonomy to experiment with new 
ideas and practices. Rather, the authorities should identify those new elements which are suitable 
to modern life under Chinese conditions and foster experimentation and innovation in those areas; 
other elements which are not deemed so suitable (by the authorities) should continue to be 
proscribed. This is a formula which should sound familiar. It is very much a continuation of the 
"Chinese learning a s  the foundation, Western learning for its practical applications" slogan 
advocated by China's 19th century modernizing elite. 
Critics of recent cultural trends differ on whether the resurgence of traditional practices or 
the influx of Western influences is more problematic and potentially harmful. Some argue that 
China's most serious problems stem from the way centralized state socialism reinforced the worst, 
"feudal" tendencies of the traditional legacy, producing "little emperors" ruling over factories, 
offices, and schools throughout China. For such critics the revival of traditional cultural forms 
and the new respect given to Confucian ideas is particularly worrisome, since these can only make 
the effort to eliminate "feudal remnants" from contemporary China more diff~cult. 
Others argue, however, that Western influences pose more of a threat than the revived 
traditional practices. In addition to the greater familiarity of the traditional heritage, there is also 
the comfortable (but probably mistaken) view that "harmful" traditional practices are the products 
of backwardness and ignorance, so that with time, modernization, and rising educational levels, 
these will gradually disappear from the scene. No such assumption can be made about foreign 
influences. In addition to their being more alien to begin with, they are found in societies that are 
more modern and well educated than China. The dilemma for those who would be screeners of 
such foreign influences, then, is how to identify which elements of Western culture are required by 
any modern society and thus have to be allowed to develop in China, and which elements are 
unnecessary for China's modernization effort. Where do neckties, rock music, premarital sex, or 
for that matter electoral democracy and competitive individualism fit? 
As the central authorities have struggled with these problems they have been unable to 
come to a consensus. Clearly, the more radical among the reformers feel that China benefits from 
most of the new Western cultural infusions, and that the resulting changes in Chinese practices to 
date have been too slow. In other words, the new influences have still only had a partial and 
superficial effect, mostly among the young and among urban intellectuals, and they have not yet 
had much impact on the deep recesses of Chinese organizations, families, and individual psyches. 
But even the infusions of Western influence to date are seen as  excessive and undesirable by more 
conservative leaders. As noted, the latter see both a rising tide of social problems and a loss of 
national pride and faith in the system as stemming from the open door. These conservatives 
argue that the loss of control by the center over cultural innovation and transmission is even more 
dangerous than the specific kinds of harmful phenomena fostered, for it spells the doom of any 
serious attempt to forge cultural unity, and will thus lead to political fragmentation and social 
chaos. 
Twice in the 1980s these conservatives have managed to launch campaigns designed to gain 
greater control over Chinese cultural life and punish those involved in spreading "unhealthy" 
Western influences--in the "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" campaign of 1983-4 and the "Anti-Bourgois 
Liberalization" campaign of 1987. The fact that each of these conservative initiatives was 
watered down and petered out after a few months, after claiming a few prominent victims and 
intimidating many others, does not mean that the debate is now over. I t  merely indicates that for 
the moment, a t  least, the conservatives have not managed to gain sufficient support within the 
elite for a more thorough cultural crackdown. 
Meanwhile, if we descend from the elite level down to the ordinary population, we find not 
so much debate but confusion and uncertainty. The Chinese man and woman in the street (and 
rural lane), while generally appreciative of improved consumption standards and less oppressive 
political controls, often find the lack of clear consensus on values and cultural forms unsettling. 
For people who have grown up in a highly didactive and' moralistic society, in which right and 
wrong practices were constantly drummed into their heads, the situation of being faced with 
options and no clear standards for selection is unfamiliar. Should they cultivate an interest in 
Western classical music, rock, traditional operas, Chinese folk tunes, or perhaps favorite martial 
tunes from the socialist tradition (or all of the above)? Should they wear the latest Western 
fashions or retain the proletarian drab of the Mao era? Should they push their children to follow 
the "white road" (to academic learning and expertise), the "yellow road" (to business success and 
financial wealth), or the "red road" (toward political activism and Party membership)? How 
should they celebrate a family wedding or a funeral? How would they react if a son came home 
and announced he wanted to leave a state job to go into private business, live together with his 
girlfriend without benefit of marriage, or go into training to become a Buddhist monk? 
This uneasiness of the general population has several sources. I t  is not simply that people 
are unfamiliar with being faced by such choices. Nor is it solely a matter of being nervous in the 
face of the uncharacteristic restraint of the CCP, and worried that in the future, if this restraint is 
abandoned and a forceful imposition of cultural uniformity is resumed, they may be criticized for 
having made the wrong choices. As much as  anything else, this popular uneasiness can be 
attributed to the fact that both in imperial times and in the Maoist era, Chinese have become 
accustomed to living in a society in which habits and cultural forms are infused with political and 
moral meanings that flow from the cultural orthodoxy. Even though the PRC is an avowedly 
atheistic state, in a certain sense until the reform era China was a minimally secularized society. 
The sort of secularized, pragmatic societies in which Westerners have grown up, in which most 
spheres of daily life and culture are seen as detached from higher moral battles, has not been part 
of Chinese experience heretofore. For this reason many Chinese have the gnawing feeling that 
they are sailing into uncharted seas without a clear moral rudder. The current situation may then 
be interpreted not so much in terms of new freedoms and choices, but as a moral vacuum in 
which, for example, individuals are encouraged to get rich without experiencing the restraints of 
either socialist, traditional Confucian, or Western moral values. 
The efforts of the reformers to alleviate these concerns by formulating a revised ideological 
and moral framework to guide China in the new era have so far not been very convincing or 
satisfying to the population. The Chinese people are told that various ideas and practices are good 
or bad, but they are given no clear set of principles explaining why, or which would allow them to 
tell the difference. The concept of China being in the "primary stage of socialism," popularized by 
the reformers in 1987, does not seem to provide the needed moral guidance. This concept mainly 
justifies allowing traditional Chinese and Western capitalist, as well as  socialist, practices to 
coexist for some time to come, as  long as they contribute to modernization. Many Chinese are 
skeptical of the idea that their society can be guided by a moral framework that says simply that 
whatever works economically is good and whatever doesn't is bad. Some Chinese thinkers are 
attempting to fill the moral void by adapting portions of Confucianism, the writings of the "young 
Marx," and Western doctrines of individual rights and dignity to form a new amalgam they call 
Chinese "humanism." However, these efforts are still a t  an early stage, and what guidance these 
new humanist ideas might provide for meeting a variety of problems in life is still not very clear. 
So as  yet no coherent set of moral standards has emerged to replace those discredited by the 
excesses of the Cultural Revolution. The worry the reformers face is that their conservative 
opponents may be able to play on public unease about the moral vacuum and cultural confusion to 
engineer a return to a more closed-door society with an imposed and anti-Western cultural 
orthodoxy. 
China has struggled for more than a century to cope with the problems involved in adapting 
Chinese culture to the modern world. The fact that Chineseness has been seen in cultural terms, 
and that for most Chinese, whether elites or masses, forging a unitary cultural orthodoxy has 
been seen a s  vital, has meant that cultural debates have constantly spilled over into the political 
realm. By the same token, political leaders in imperial, &publican, Maoist, and reform-era China 
have all had devising and implementing the proper cultural policy high on their political agenda. 
But in spite of this century of efforts, the debate, particularly in terms of how Chinese culture will 
be accommodated to Western influence, is still unresolved, and arguments in this realm remain 
volatile. Whether a clear cultural orthodoxy will emerge from the new round of debates on these 
issues in Deng Xiaoping's China, and if so what form that orthodoxy might take, are matters still 
very unclear. 
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